Regulation often takes the form of a standard that can be met through the implementation of any of a number of different policies. This paper examines how the authority to set the standard and the authority to choose the combination of policies to meet the standard should be allocated between a central government and local governments. In the context of the United States, for example, should standards regarding such public goods as the environment or education be set and implemented by the federal government, by individual state governments, or by both? Because decisions about setting and/or meeting the standard can be non-contractible, an incomplete contracting approach is used. Contractibility is allowed to depend on power allocation. A central finding is that a reverse form of delegation from the regulatory structure often used in federations such as the United States and the European Union can be the most efficient.
Introduction
The issue of how best to distribute power between different tiers of a hierarchical government has been of interest to economists at least since the time Tiebout (1956) , Olson (1969) and Oates (1972) published their pioneering works on the topic. Under what circumstances would it be optimal to distribute regulatory responsibility to both central (or federal) and local (or state) tiers of government? In the context of the United States, for example, should standards regarding such public goods as the environment or education be set and implemented by the federal government, by individual state governments, or by both? Likewise, in the context of the European Union, which regulatory decisions should be made by the European Commission, and which by individual member countries? In a firm, is it better for the boss to decide the production target and how to achieve it, or should the power to make one or both of these decisions be delegated to her subordinates? More generally, in any hierarchical organization, who should have the power to set and meet standards: the central authority, or the constituent units? In this paper I use an incomplete contracting paradigm to examine the efficiency of delegating regulatory power, and make a case for why, under certain circumstances, the form of delegation often used in such federations as the United States and the European Union should be reversed.
Regulations that involve standards can be modeled as a two-stage decision-making process. In the first stage, a standard, or target output level, is set for each state (or unit). The output level can correspond to, for example, an air quality standard, a student test score standard, or a production target. The first-stage standard chosen stipulates the output level that each state must achieve.
In the second stage of regulation, policies, or inputs, are chosen for each state in order to meet the standard chosen in stage one. Because there are multiple combinations of policies that can meet a given standard, the input decision entails choosing a particular input policy mix. For example, to meet a given air quality standard, a decision must be made about the policy for reducing smokestack emissions from power plants and that for reducing tailpipe C.-Y.C. Lin 2 emissions from cars. Likewise, to meet educational standards, a policy mix of training teachers and buying new books needs to be chosen. Similarly, a manufacturing plant can choose to produce a target number of widgets by training workers to better operate new machines, or by hiring more workers to assemble the widgets manually.
Among the different types of input policy that might be chosen to meet the output standard, some may involve spillovers from one state to another. For example, a policy that abates emissions from power plants in one state is likely to benefit neighboring states because it would reduce the plume that is blown across state boundaries. In contrast, a policy that abates emissions from low-lying automobile tailpipes is less likely to have any effect on other states. Similarly, multiple states might benefit from one state's teacher training program, especially if teachers move from state to state, but no other state will be affected if, say, the state of Massachusetts were to simply buy newer books for its own schoolchildren. Likewise, educating workers to operate new machines may induce knowledge spillovers across plants that would not be generated by merely hiring more unskilled workers.
It is often the case that the policies with more positive spillovers are also the ones that are more expensive to implement. As a consequence, the policy that is more costly from the standpoint of an individual state is less costly from a social point of view, and the noncooperative decisions of individual states, which do not account for interstate spillovers, will diverge from the optimal coordinated choice. Inefficiencies would therefore arise if individual states were allocated the power either to set the standard or to meet the standard, or both.
In contrast, for both stages of regulatory decision-making, a federal government would be able to internalize any externalities that exist among local state governments and achieve a cooperative outcome.
Although the central government can internalize externalities, however, it suffers from an agency problem: its preferences are less well-aligned with local citizen welfare than those of state governments are. For example, because the electoral college system in the United States induces incumbent presidential candidates to care more about states with more electoral C.-Y.C. Lin 3 votes, the federal government might care little about educational quality and other public goods in states such as Montana that have few electoral college votes. Similarly, a concern for international affairs and military power abroad may induce the federal government to neglect domestic local public goods altogether. Another reason why the federal government's preferences might not reflect the true preferences of the local citizens is an information problem: unlike state governments, which may have local private information, the federal government is unable to correctly measure what the true benefits and costs are and therefore uses an incorrect estimate of them. In contrast, local governments are better able to tailor their policy to the preferences of their particular local constituents, and therefore have preferences that are better aligned with local preferences. As a consequence, while state governments act in the interest of local citizen welfare, central governments do not. 2 The key trade-off between centralized and decentralized systems of regulation that I model is thus the following: while the central government can better internalize externalities, local governments have better aligned preferences. 3 Because of this trade-off, it is possible 2 Although much of the literature defines the information problem as distinct from the agency problem, in this paper I allow information problems to be a possible soure of an agency problem causing the federal government's objective function to diverge from social welfare. 3 In addition to internalizing externalities, a second advantage of federal control is that it mitigates any "race to the bottom" that may ensue from decentralized decision-making and interjurisdictional competition. According to this line of argument, state control may lead to an underprovision of public goods because local officials would set excessively lax environmental standards in order to attract businesses to and create jobs in their respective districts (Oates, 2001 ). In contrast, under federal control such interjurisdictional competition would no longer occur. However, because economists have only recently begun to find empirical evidence that environmental regulations affect polluting industries' plant location, employment or investment decisions (see Levinson, 2003 , & references therein), I do not include a possible race to the bottom in my model. Although I do not explicitly model a race to the bottom, I do capture its reduced-form implication in two ways. First, a race to the bottom is a special form of spillover arising from emission source mobility: one state's regulatory decision may spill over to another state if it causes firms to relocate. Thus, it is possible that the spillover in my model results from a race to the bottom. Second, if one interprets each state's environmental benefit functions broadly as the measuring the benefits from environmental quality net of any foregone capital and the federal benefit functions as measuring the gross environmental benefits alone, then, by positing that the federal and state governments use different benefit functions, my model arguably captures another reduced-form implication of a race to the bottom.
There are several other arguments for centralized control as well that I do not model. For example, a third advantage of centralization is that manufacturers may prefer a uniform federal standard to heterogeneous local standards because the latter may require them to modify their product for each local market. Fourth, centralization may be justified on environmental justice grounds, for the federal government may be able to induce more equitable or redistributive outcomes than would otherwise arise from decentralized control. Fifth, the federal government may be the tier of government best suited for the gathering and dissemination of information about environmental damages and pollution-control techniques, and for the support that the most efficient regulatory structure may involve delegation: the central government retains the power to either set or meet the standard, but not both, and delegates the power to make the remaining decision to the local governments.
The issue of how to distribute power between different tiers of government has been examined extensively by economists over the past few decades, and much of their work has focused on the same trade-off I have chosen between externalities and local preferences (see e.g. Alesina, Baqir & Hoxby, 2002, & references therein). The primary distinguishing feature of this paper is that, while most of the previous literature on federalism has been agnostic about the nature of the underlying contractual environment, I analyze the issue using an incomplete contracting paradigm.
An incomplete contracting apporach is needed because decisions about setting and/or meeting the standard can be non-contractible. The allocation of decision-making power matters precisely because the non-contractibility precludes individual states from coordinating with each other via contracts and side payments. If states could write contracts with each other, then they could internalize externalities and achieve the social optimum on their own, and there would be no need to allocate power to a central government. However, when contracts are incomplete, then the allocation of power matters because it determines which tier of government can make which decision.
In addition to exploiting novel synergies between the two erstwhile separate literatures on incomplete contracts and on federalism in order to examine the optimal distribution of regulatory power, a second main contribution of this paper is that it allows for the possibility that including the federal government in the regulatory hierarchy renders decisions about output contractible. For example, if the federal government has regulatory power, it might be able to monitor and verify the output levels, and therefore enable states to contract on and funding of research to generate such information. Sixth, if there are bureaucracy costs to increasing the number of tiers of government involved, costs analogous to those Qian (1994) studied in his model of hierarchies within firms, centralized control may be preferred to any system of partial decentralization in which both the federal and state levels of government play a role. I assume that all these considerations are secondary to the ability of a central government to coordinate decisions.
them. The dependence of contractibility on power distribution is an added complexity heretofore absent in models of organizational structure.
The particular regulatory structure that is often used for many regulations in such federations as the United States and the European Union is "conjoint federalism", where the central government sets a standard that individual states must then implement policies to meet. For example, air quality regulation in both the U.S. and the EU stipulates that standards be chosen by the central authority and implemented by individual states (Farrell & Keating 1998; Europa, 2004a Although conjoint federalism is commonplace, it is not clear that it is the optimal regulatory structure. Beginning in 1969, conjoint federalism supplanted state control for many environmental regulations in the United States as a result of federal research in pollution, mounting public concern with environmental issues and the ineffectiveness of state pollution control efforts (Keleman, 2004) . Conjoint federalism thus appears to have arisen out of a desire to involve the federal government in environmental regulation, although the particular form of involvement (i.e., via setting the standards) might not have been taken into consideration and therefore may not have been optimally chosen. The novelty of this paper is to posit that there are several ways in which the different tiers of government can be involved in environmental regulation, and that there may be alternative regulatory structures involving the federal government that may be better than conjoint federalism. The prevalence of con-joint federalism suggests that while those who designed the regulatory structure were correct that the federal government should be included, they perhaps did not fully optimize on the particular allocation of decision-making authority. Indeed, states backlashed against conjoint federalism in the early 1990s because it was inflexible and constrained state autonomy (Keleman, 2004) .
One central finding of this paper is that under certain circumstances, a case can be made for a reverse form of delegation, in which the federal government retains the power to meet the standard but delegates the power to set individual standards to the states. Moreover, if output becomes contractible when the federal government has power and the federal government uses the correct cost function, then reverse conjoint federalism can achieve the first-best outcome. Thus, contrary to common practice, it may be best to allow individual units to each set their own standard and then to have the central authority decide how each unit should meet its standard. For example, states should each decide their own air quality standard or test score standard, but the federal government should be the tier that decides how to regulate emissions sources and how to improve schools in order to meet these standards. The federal role should be that of a facilitator.
The results therefore suggest that social welfare may be increased by reversing the form of delegation often used in regulatory decision making. can be second-best efficient is one of the central findings of this paper. A third innovation is that my primary application is not firm boundaries but rather federalism. The regulation of public goods such as environmental quality is well-suited to Hart and Holmstrom's framework because externalities are rampant, preferences over these public goods can differ, and because both input and output can be difficult to observe and verify. A final innovation is that I allow for the possibility that decisions about output become contractible if and only if the federal government has power. The dependence of contractibility on power distribution is an added complexity heretofore absent in models of organizational structure.
In addition to that on firm boundaries, a second sub-branch of the incomplete contracting literature that relates to this paper is that on the allocation of authority (see e.g. Aghion 
Federalism
The second main strand of literature relevant to this paper is that on federalism. According to Webster's dictionary (1991, p. 454), federalism is defined as "the distribution of power in an organization (as a government) between a central authority and the constituent units." In the context of the United States, and in the terminology used in this paper, the central authority is the federal government and the constituent units are the states. In the context of the European Union, the issue of federalism is sometimes termed "subsidiarity", which is "the principle whereby the Union does not take action (except in the areas which fall within its exclusive competence) unless it is more effective than action taken at national, pleteness. An incomplete contracting paradigm is essential for any sensible examination of federalism, as it is precisely because contracts are incomplete that the allocation of power matters. Moreover, regulation is well-suited to an incomplete contracting paradigm because it is often difficult, if not impossible, for individual states to contract on either input policies or output levels.
A second contribution that this paper makes to the federalism literature is that it enables a comparison of some of the main competing arguments for local control. Most previous models of federalism focus exclusively on one of the disadvantages of centralization, C.-Y.C. Lin 10 whether it be inferior information about local conditions (Crémer, Estache & Seabright, 1996) ; diminished accountability to the wishes of any particular region or locality (Seabright, 1996) ; incentives that are not perfectly aligned with citizen welfare (see e.g. Qian By exploiting novel synergies between the literatures on incomplete contracting and on federalism, this paper makes valuable contributions to both.
A Model of Delegation in Regulation 3.1 The Two Stages of Regulation
A common form of regulation involves the setting and meeting of standards for a particular good in question. This good, which I term "output", is the good regulators care of widgets produced, or, more abstractly, performance. Let q i denote the output in state i.
In order to produce the output good, policies must be implemented. I call these policies "inputs". There are two different types of input policy that can be implemented to produce output: type-a and type-b. These two types may represent, for example, two different types of technology, emissions reductions from two different types of sources, two different policy instruments, or investment in human versus physical capital. In the case of ozone smog regulation, since ozone is formed in ambient air by two different types of precursors, each input type may correspond to a policy for reducing emissions of a different type of precursor. 6 The input policy choice of each state i is given by the vector (a i , b i ) of two types of input.
I model regulation as a two-stage process. In the first stage, a standard is set: that is, the output q i is chosen for each state i. In the second stage, the standard is met: that is, the input policy mix (a i , b i ) is chosen for each state i in order to implement the set of output standards {q i } i chosen in the first stage. 7 I assume that, irrespective of who makes the choice, policies are always chosen to comply with the standard dictated in stage 1.
There are generically many combinations of the two types of input policy that can be implemented in order to meet any given output standard. However, the particular choice of type-a and type-b input policy levels will be governed by the following trade-off: while the type-b input policy is privately less costly to implement, the type-a input policy induces positive spillovers and thus is the socially less costly input type. As a consequence, a noncooperative Nash equilibrium 8 input policy choice would allocate more input toward type-b than a coordinated choice would. My distinction between these two types of input is needed to allow for the possibility that, even after the output standard is chosen, it matters whether or not the input policy choice is made in a coordinated fashion.
There are many reasons why the effects of a policy may spill over from one state to another. For example, if the policy generated and disseminated knowledge and other forms of human capital, then such human capital could easily spill over to other states. Similarly, if the input policy abated emissions of a transboundary pollutant, then any policy that abated the pollutant in one state would result in lower quantities of that pollutant in another state.
For concreteness, consider air quality regulation. Once set, a given standard for ambient air quality can be met through a combination of two types of policy: a policy that reduces smokestack emissions from power plants (type-a), and a policy that reduces tailpipe emissions from cars (type-b). Power plants are more expensive to regulate but, because smokestack emissions can be blown from one state to another, the benefits from smokestack regulation in one state can spill over to the other state. In contrast, cars are cheaper to regulate, but, because low-lying tailpipe emissions are unlikely to get blown across state boundaries, the tailpipe regulatory policy in one state does not affect any other state. 9 Thus, while it may be privately less costly to abate emissions from cars than it is to abate emissions from power plants, it may be socially more costly to do so. 10 As another example, consider education. Once a standard is set for student achievement, it can be met by either the privately less costly policy of teaching to the test (type-b)
or by the socially more cost-effective policy of teacher training (type-a). Unlike a policy of teaching to the test, a teacher training program, while more expensive for a state to implement, is likely to have positive spillovers onto other states, which may benefit from, for example, better trained teachers who move to their states, or from ideas for how to develop a training program of their own.
There are thus two types of regulatory decisions that can be made for each state i: the stage-one decision about setting the output standard q i and the stage-two decision about the 9 In this stylized example, I assume that cars themselves do not travel across state borders and that car manufacturers tailor their cars to meet the regulations set by each state. I also assume that it makes no difference to the profits of car manufacturers how the state-by-state tailpipe regulations are set. 10 The application to environmental federalism is described in more detail in Lin (2006) . input policy mix (a i , b i ) that should be implemented to meet the standard. I now outline the various ways in which the power to make these decisions can be allocated.
Decentralization Scenarios
In my model, governmental power encompasses the right to make decisions and the ability to enforce them. There are two types of power: one for each of the two stages of regulation. Output power is the right and ability to set, measure, monitor, and enforce the standard for output q i in stage one. Input power is the right and ability to choose, measure, monitor, and enforce the (conditional) input policies (a i , b i ) to meet the standard in stage two. 11 For each state i, the output boss OB i is the tier of government with output power while the input boss IB i is the tier with input power. 12 The two types of power can be separately allocated to different tiers of government. In addition to the social optimum, there are four decentralization scenarios: state (S) control, federal (F) control, conjoint federalism (C), and reverse conjoint federalism (R).
As shown in Table 1 , each decentralization scenario corresponds to a different allocation of power between the federal tier of government and the state tier of government. 13 
The Incomplete Contracting Framework
The primary feature that distinguishes this paper from previous work on regulatory federalism is that I operate in a paradigm of contractual incompleteness. In particular, I
assume that neither decisions about the input policies (a i , b i ) nor decisions about the output good q i are contractible among individual states either ex ante or ex post. Under these assumptions, the distribution of the two types of power is important because it determines 11 I sometimes refer to the stage-two input policy choice as a "conditional" input policy choice, since the choice is conditional on the stage-one output standard. 12 My notion of power is analogous to the notion of ownership propounded by Hart and Holmstrom (2002) ; the "boss" terminology is borrowed from their work as well. 13 A possible extension to the model would distinguish between the power to make decisions about typea input and the power to make decisions about type-b input, and would then evaluate a decentralization scenario in which these two types of input power are allocated to different tiers of government. which tier of government can decide the levels of input and output that will be implemented. A second reason why states cannot contract on input and output is that, even if they were written, contracts between individual local governments may not be enforceable. For example, if the "states" in my model were individual countries, then no contracts between these sovereign states could be enforced.
A third reason why contracts might be incomplete is that, especially for public goods, input and output are subject to what Williamson (1971) termed "strategic misrepresentation risk" and therefore might not be verifiable. In the context of air quality regulation, for example, one possible argument for the non-verifiability of the input policy is as follows.
Input policies, such as those stipulating reductions in power plant emissions, need to be enforced. Because the input boss is endowed with enforcement authority, he can essentially enforce whatever emissions reductions he wishes, and can neglect to enforce any reductions imposed upon him from outside. Indeed, owing to spillovers in input policies, if state governments had input power, meaning that states rather than the central government each had its own enforcement authority, then each state government would likely have an incentive to mislead the other state governments about the extent and success of its policies. Even if Ohio and Maine wrote a contract that specified the amount of smokestack emissions 14 Later on in this paper I will allow for the case in which output q i becomes contractible when the federal government has at least one form of power, for example because the federal government standardizes measurement equipment when it is involved in the regulation.
reductions that would take place in each state, Ohio might claim to have complied without Maine ever being able to verify that it did, for Ohio could easily mislead Maine about how much abatement it achieved. Similar arguments could be made for why the quality of an educational input policy to train teachers may not be verifiable.
The argument for the non-verifiability of output is similar. Output must be monitored or measured. Since the quality of the environment or of schools is difficult to measure or monitor with certainty, its level can be obscured by the government with output power from all other governments. Thus, at least for my basic model, output is not contractible. Later I assume that output becomes contractible when the federal government has power because the federal government can standardize the measurement technology. This assumption actually strengthens the case for the optimality of reverse conjoint federalism.
I choose the incomplete contracting framework for two main reasons. A first reason why I assume contracts are incomplete is to provide a possible justification for the existence of a federal government. If contracts were complete, then individual state governments could coordinate by contracting on input and output levels and then dividing the surplus through transfers or side payments; as a consequence, there would be no need to allocate any power to a central government and therefore no need for a federal government at all. It is precisely because contracts are incomplete and coordination is no longer possible that one might consider creating a central government and allocating power to it.
A second reason for contractual incompleteness is that my assumptions on the noncontractibility of input and output seem reasonable in the context of public goods regulation.
High transactions costs, the lack of enforcement, and non-verifiability are all possible reasons why input policies, and, to a lesser extent, output goods, are non-contractible among states.
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Welfare
In my simple model, there is one federal government and two state governments. 15 The aggregate benefit to residents of state i of output q i is V i (q i ).
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Benefits are measured in terms of money equivalents. Because I use the sum over all states of the aggregate benefits to each state i as my welfare criterion, I call V i (q i ) the "true" benefit function for state i.
While each state government uses its correct respective aggregate benefit function in assessing the benefits of output, the federal government does not. Thus, there is an agency problem: the preferences of the federal government over the output good differ from those of the local constituents.
There are many possible reasons why the federal government's preferences may not reflect social welfare. institutions such as the electoral college system may also create incentives for the federal government to care about some states more than others. A second reason why the federal government may fail to maximize social welfare is that, for equity reasons, it may prefer to use the same benefit function for all states. For example, it may be constrained, perhaps by legislation, to value education or the environment in both states equally. A third source of an agency problem is the need for the federal government to balance domestic with foreign policy objectives. Owing to possible trade-offs between national and international interests, the federal government may not be able to fully attend to domestic concerns. A fourth 15 My model can of course be generalized to any organization consisting of a central authority and constituent units. 16 I remain agnostic about how the benefit functions from individual citizens are aggregated to the state level. 17 I assume in this paper that the preferences of the state governments are perfectly aligned with local welfare. The same arguments still apply even if this assumption were relaxed, as long as the preferences of the state governments are better aligned with local preferences than those of the federal government are.
reason why the federal government might not use the true benefit functions is an information problem: the federal government is unable to correctly measure what the true benefits are, as such information may be local or private information to the states, and therefore uses an incorrect estimate of them. Thus, voting rules, equity concerns, international objectives, and informational asymmetries are all potential sources of an agency problem.
One strength of my model is that it is agnostic about the actual mechanism underlying the agency problem; my results therefore do not hinge on the verity of any particular agency story, but rest only on the assumption that some story exists that makes the state government's preferences better aligned with local welfare than the federal government's preferences are. Thus, the model is general enough to capture the reduced-form implications of any of a number of agency stories.
To model the agency problem in its most general form, I allow the benefit function used by the federal government to differ from the true benefit function. For each state i, the federal government uses the "federal" benefit function V F,i (q i ) as the aggregate state benefit instead of the "true" benefit function V i (q i ).
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While each state reaps benefits from its own output, it also incurs the costs of the input policy that is chosen to meet the standard for this output. For each state i, the input policy mix (a i , b i ) imposes a cost C i (a i , b i ). 19 Owing to an agency problem, the federal government uses a possibly incorrect cost function C F,i (a i , b i ).
Owing to spillovers in the type-a input policies, each state i's output q i is a function of 18 For example, one can model the federal benefit function as simply a non-negative scalar multiple of the true benefit function:
where η i ≥ 0. One can interpret the parameters η = (η 1 , η 2 ) as the vector of weights that the federal government puts on the states' benefit functions in its own objective function. Different mechanisms underlying the agency problem would be manifested in different values of this weight vector. Moreover, if η = (1, 1), then there is no agency problem; the federal benefit functions reflect the true benefit functions. 19 I assume that states always incur the costs of their own policies regardless of who makes the policy choice. If the federal government chooses the input policies, this assumption is reasonable if, for example, the federal government levies taxes from each state to pay for the policies it implements in the state.
Because there are two different types of policy, there are possibly many different policy vectors (a i , b i ) that can achieve any standard for output q i . When there is a multiplicity of policy choices that can meet a given standard, it is possible that the conditional input levels chosen in a non-coordinated Nash equilibrium would differ from those that would be chosen cooperatively. In particular, since I assume that type-b input is privately less costly but socially more costly than type-a input is, a non-coordinated Nash equilibrium input choice would allocate more input to type-b than a social planner would.
The utility U i for each state i is simply the benefits it accrues from its output minus the input costs it incurs to achieve it:
Thus, while each state only incurs the cost of its own input, its benefits depends on the input levels of both states through their effect on that state's own output. I assume that each state i will always act so as to maximize its own utility U i .
Since each state government's utility function correctly reflects the aggregate utility of its citizens, total welfare W is given by the sum of the utilities of all the states:
A social planner would use total welfare W as her objective function. In contrast, because the federal government uses its own benefit and functions for the output good in place of the true benefit and cost functions, the federal government's objective function U F is given
I assume that the federal government will always act so as to maximize U F , even though the benefits of output and the costs of input accrue to the citizens of the individual states.
The marginal private cost of producing output via type-a input for state i is given by:
while the marginal private cost of producing output via type-b input is given by:
Because type-a input spills over from one state to another, the marginal private cost of producing output via type-a input differs from its marginal social cost. I define the marginal social cost of producing output via type-a input in state i as:
Because type-b input does not spill over, its marginal social cost is equal to its marginal private cost for both states i:
I assume it is privately (weakly) more costly to implement the type-a policy, but socially 
The marginal federal cost of producing output via type-b input is given by:
( 1 0 )
The Social Optimum
The social optimum would arise if a social planner had both input power and output power. In order to establish the first-best benchmark against which I will compare the various decentralization scenarios, I first derive the solution to the social planner's problem.
The social planner's two-stage regulatory problem is solved backwards. In the second stage of regulation, the social planner chooses the input policy levels (a i , b i ) for each state i in order to meet the output levels q = (q 1 , q 2 ) chosen in stage one. Because the social planner has input power over all states, the conditional input levels will be chosen cooperatively. In particular, given any vector of outputs, she would choose input so as to minimize the sum of the costs to the two states. I will call conditional input levels cost-effective if, among all input levels that achieve a given target of output vectors, they implement the given output vector at minimum total cost. The cost-effective input choice
is given by:
The first-order condition for each state i is to set the marginal social cost MSC 
which can be written in terms of marginal private costs as: of its q i = q i isoquant, where q i is the output level chosen for state i in stage one.
In the first stage of regulation, the social planner chooses the output standard q i is chosen for each state i, anticipating the stage-two conditional input choices. Because the social planner has output power over all states, the standards would be set for both states simultaneously to maximize total welfare. Her problem is thus given by: 
State Control
Under state control, each state retains its own input power and output power, and both inputs and outputs are chosen non-cooperatively. In the second stage of regulation, a Nash equilibrium in inputs would arise in which, for any given vector of outputs, each state would choose the conditional input levels that minimize its own costs of implementing its target output subject to the input levels chosen by the other state. In order to minimize its own cost, each state i would solve:
where the input choices (a j , b j ) of the other state are taken as given. The first-order condition for state i would be to set its marginal private cost MP C A of producing output via type-a input equal to the marginal private cost MP C B of producing output via type-b input:
( 1 6 ) This non-cooperative Nash equilibrium first-order condition can also be interpreted as requiring each state i to set the slope − ∂C i ∂a i ∂C i ∂b i
of its private budget constraint equal to the slope
of its q i = q i isoquant, where q i is the output level chosen for state i in stage one. This first-order condition yields the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium conditional input levels ¡ a
For any given output vector q = (q 1 , q 2 ), the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium conditional input levels will generically differ from the cost-effective ones, since equation (16) differs from equation (12) . Thus, whenever the state governments have the power to decide conditional input levels, the input levels will not be cost effective.
In the first stage of regulation, a Nash equilibrium in outputs would arise in which each state would choose its output level to maximize its own utility given the output choice of the other state and in anticipation of the conditional input choices that would be made in stage two. 20 The stage-one maximization problem for each state i would thus be:
where the appropriate conditional effective input level functions a Under state control, both the input policies and the output standards are chosen noncooperatively. As a consequence, states fail to internalize externalities in both stages of the regulatory process. These externalities will be further analyzed later in this paper.
Federal Control
Under federal control, the federal government has input power and output power over all states. In the second stage of regulation, the federal government chooses conditional input levels in a coordinated fashion to minimize total costs. Because the federal government uses possibly incorrect cost functions, however, its federal input choice © a
by:
The first-order condition for each state i is to set the marginal federal cost MF C of its q i = q i isoquant, where q i is the output level chosen for state i in stage one.
Because benefit functions do not affect the conditional input choice problem (11), if the federal government uses the correct cost functions, the federal government's conditional input choice problem is the same as that of the social planner, in which case the federal government's conditional input choice would be cost-effective. Otherwise, if the federal government uses the incorrect costs functions, its input choices may not be cost-effective even though they were chosen in a coordinated fashion.
In the first stage of regulation, the federal government would solve a similar problem to that of the social planner, except that it uses the federal benefit and costs functions in place of the true benefit and cost functions. Anticipating a federal conditional input choice in stage two, the federal government chooses output for both states simultaneously to maximize total federal benefit minus total costs:
where
are the federal conditional effective input levels given by the solution to equation (19) .
Under federal control, there are agency problems that arise in both stages of regulation because the federal government uses the federal benefit and cost functions instead of the true benefit and cost functions. This agency problem will be further analyzed later in this paper.
Conjoint Federalism
Under conjoint federalism, the state governments have input power while the federal government has output power. In the second stage of regulation, a Nash equilibrium in inputs would arise in which, for any given vector of outputs, each state would choose the input levels that minimize its own costs of implementing its target output subject to the input levels chosen by the other state. The states would solve the same second-stage problem under conjoint federalism as they would solve under state control. The conditional
¢ under conjoint federalism are thus equal to those under state control:
and are given by the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium first-order condition (16) . Thus, just as under state control, the conditional input choices under conjoint federalism are not cost effective.
In stage one, the federal government would choose outputs in a coordinated fashion, while anticipating a non-cooperative conditional input choice by the states in stage two.
Owing to an agency problem, however, the federal government does not use the true benefit and cost functions. Anticipating a non-cooperative conditional input choice in stage two, the federal government chooses output for both states simultaneously to maximize total federal benefit minus total costs:
Under conjoint federalism, there is thus an externality that arises from the states' uncoordinated input choice as well as an agency problem that arises from the federal government's output choice.
Reverse Conjoint Federalism
Under reverse conjoint federalism, the federal government has input power while the state governments have output power. In the second stage of regulation, the federal government chooses conditional input levels in a coordinated fashion to minimize total costs. Just as in federal control, the federal government uses possibly incorrect cost functions. Thus,
¢ under reverse conjoint federalism are thus equal to those under federal control:
and result from the first-order condition (19) .
In stage one, a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in outputs would arise in which the state governments choose output levels in anticipation of a coordinated conditional input choice by the federal government in stage two. The problem faced by each state i is thus:
Under conjoint federalism, there is thus an externality that arises from the states' uncoordinated output choice as well as an agency problem arising from the federal government's incorrect cost function.
I now turn toward describing the externalities and the agency problems in more detail.
Types of Inefficiency
For each stage of regulation, there is a trade-off between the externality that makes local control inefficient and the agency problem that makes central control inefficient. There are thus four types of regulatory inefficiency.
In the second standard-setting stage of regulation, if states were given input power, they would fail to internalize an input choice externality: conditional on the output levels q = (q 1 , q 2 ) chosen in stage 1, each state i does not account for the effect that its choice of input (a i , b i ) has on the cost, and therefore the utility, of the other state. Changes in state i's choice of input levels will change the input levels that state j needs to exert in order to meet state j's output standard q j and therefore changes the cost to state j of implementing q j .
For any given air quality standard, individual states would choose to overallocate their input policy towards the individually less costly policy of reducing automobile tailpipe emissions.
An input choice externality arises whenever states have input power.
In contrast, if the federal government were given input power, then an input agency problem would arise because the federal government uses the incorrect cost function.
For the standard-setting stage, if states were given output power, they would fail to internalize an output choice externality: in stage 1, given the other state's choice of output q j , each state i does not account for the effects that its choice of output q i has on the cost, and therefore the utility, of the other state. A change in state i's choice of output changes the levels of input in both states, and therefore changes the cost to state j of meeting its own output q j . For example, in choosing its own air quality standard, Maine might set a more stringent standard than a social planner would because it anticipates that its standard would be met in part by reductions in power plant emissions from upwind states such as Ohio, reductions it would not need to pay for itself. An output choice externality arises whenever states have output power, regardless of which tier of government has input power.
If, on the other hand, the federal government were given output power, then an output agency problem would arise because the federal government's objective function diverge from social welfare. In particular, the benefit and cost functions used by the federal government differ from the true local benefit and cost functions.
The optimal allocation of the power in each stage should therefore depend on the relative magnitude of the externality that arises from local governments' non-coordinated decision in that stage and the agency problem that arises when the central government makes the decision, and should therefore vary from case to case depending on the functional form assumptions, the values of the parameters, as well as on the power allocation in the other stage.
Second-Best Efficiency: An Example
In this section, I examine the efficiency of the four decentralization scenarios under a particular set of functional form and parameter assumptions. For the most part, particular function forms were chosen to facilitate the derivation of closed-form solutions. However, the main intuition behind my results are robust to the particular functional forms chosen.
I assume that all functions and parameters are known to all governments.
C.-Y.C. Lin 30 For the benefit functions, I assume that the true benefit function from output is logarithmic for each state i:
where v i > 0 ∀i. I choose a logarithmic form both because it simplifies the analytic solution and because it results in nonnegative benefit functions for all output levels.
Since I assume that the federal benefit function for each state i is simply a non-negative scalar multiple of state i's true benefit function, the federal benefit function is given by:
where η i ≥ 0. One can interpret the parameters η = (η 1 , η 2 ) as the vector of weights that the federal government puts on the states' benefit functions in its own objective function. For the cost functions, I assume that the cost
and identical for the two states i:
where c a > 0 and c b > 0. While perhaps unrealistic, the assumption of linear and identical cost functions enables me to most easily and cleanly present the intuition behind my results. For the production functions, I assume that the output in each state i is a linear function of input:
where f A > 0, f B > 0 and f A + f B = 1, and where the type-a effective input spillover α i is a measure of the extent of the spillover to state i from state j's choice of type-a input. I assume that the type-a input spills over from state 2 to state 1, but not from state 1 to state 2: α 1 ∈ (0, 1] and α 2 = 0.
Proposition 1 Let the welfare under decentralization scenario X be denoted as W X , where
and puts no weight on the benefits to at least one of the states (i.e., if ∃i s.t.
Proof. Let the welfare difference between decentralization scenario X and decentralization
Thus, if the federal government uses the correct cost function and puts little weight on the benefits of at least one of the states, then delegation via reverse conjoint federalism is the most efficient decentralization scenario and, moreover, delegation via conjoint federalism is the least efficient. The latter results is particularly ironic since conjoint federalism is the form of power distribution often used in regulation. Although putting zero weight on one state's benefits is an extreme form of the agency problem, the result that reverse conjoint federalism is second-best efficient when the agency problem is sufficiently severe hold more generally for less extreme cases as well.
Allocation
As seen in the previous section, a case can be made for why reverse conjoint federalism is second best. One institutional modification that would guarantee that reverse conjoint federalism were first best when the federal government uses the correct cost functions would be to make output contractible when the federal government has at least one form of power.
In other words, (a i , b i ) is never contractible; q i is not contractible unless the federal government is included in the regulatory hierarchy. Under these assumptions, the distribution of power is important because it determines which tier of government can make decisions about input, decisions that are not contractible, and because it determines whether or not output is contractible.
One justification for why granting the federal government power would render output contractible is that unlike individual states, which each have an incentive to obfuscate its output level from the other because of spillovers, the federal government, which accounts for the utility of both states, albeit possibly incorrectly, has no such incentive. Thus, when the federal government is involved in the regulation (i.e., when it has at least one form of power), it can set up central monitoring agencies and standardize measurement equipment to observe and verify output, enabling states to contract on it.
I assume that the federal government uses the correct cost function. Unlike the benefits from a public good such as environmental quality -which depend on individual preferences, are intangible, and can be difficult to measure and monetize -costs are tangible and already denominated in money. Thus, while governments may differ in their preferences and therefore in the benefits the accrue, they are more likely to agree on the costs, assuming perfect information about the abatement technology. The result that the relative efficiency of reverse conjoint federalism is enhanced when contractibility depends on power allocation still applies even if the federal government does not use the correct cost functions.
C.-Y.C. Lin 33 If including the federal government in the regulatory hierarchy enables output to become contractible, then reverse conjoint federalism would be first-best efficient. The reasoning is as follows. When the federal government retains input power but delegates output power to states in reverse conjoint federalism, states can contract with each other to choose the welfare-maximizing output. Thus, output levels could be chosen efficiently by the states, circumventing both the output choice externality and the agency problem. Moreover, conditional on the states' output choice, the federal government would choose the cost-effective conditional input levels. Thus, both output levels and conditional input levels would be chosen efficiently. As a consequence, reverse conjoint federalism would implement the first-best outcome.
Thus, with the contractibility of output when the federal government has power, reverse conjoint federalism is the first-best decentralization scenario. If, in addition, the two input types are not perfect complements so that the Nash equilibrium conditional input levels are not cost-effective, reverse conjoint federalism will be the unique first-best decentralization scenario.
Concluding Remarks
Regulation often takes the form of a standard that can be met through the implementation of any of a number of different policies. This paper examines how the authority to set the standard and the authority to choose the combination of policies to meet the standard should be allocated between a central government and local governments, when neither setting nor meeting the standard is contractible. Is it ever second-best efficient to separately allocate the power to set the standard from the power to meet the standard? In other words, under what circumstances is it most efficient for the central government retain the power to either set or meet the standard, but not both, and delegate the power to make the remaining decision to the local governments? efficient distribution of power, delegation in its more typical form of conjoint federalism can also be the least efficient. Thus, contrary to common practice, it may be best to allow individual units to each choose set its own standard and then to have the central authority decide how each unit should meet its standard. For example, states should each decide their own air quality standard or test score standard, but the federal government should be the tier that decides how to regulate emissions sources and how to improve schools in order to meet these standards. 22 The federal government's role should be that of a facilitator.
Although reverse conjoint federalism is uncommon, some regulatory structures do resemble this form. For the regulation of crime in the United States, the federal government aids the states in meeting the criminal laws, or "output standards", they each set on their own by providing, as an "input policy", the Federal Bureau of Investigation's fingerprint service (Zimmerman, 1992) . Similarly, while states set individual child support laws, the U.S. federal government implements policies to address, enforce and collect interstate child support payments when parents live in different states (Zimmerman, 1996) . Reverse conjoint federalism also appears to describe the underlying philosophy of the World Trade Organization 
